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Price, output and welfare e®ects of third-degree price discrimination is analyzed in
the context of a risk-averse monopolist, who commits to ¯xed prices before the revela-
tion of random and potentially correlated demands. Assuming the disturbance term to
be additive, white noise and the monopolist to have a quadratic (mean-variance) utility
function, we show that price discrimination may occur with identical expected demands,
the relatively risky but price insensitive market may be charged the lower price and
despite linear demands, aggregate expected output may fall while social welfare rises.
All of these results, which run counter to those in the deterministic model, are shown to
be driven by the asymmetry in the revenue and risk characteristics of the markets and
the willingness of the monopolist to trade increased level for reduced risk of expected
pro¯t in a manner similar to portfolio choice with risky and correlated assets.
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The social desirability of third-degree price discrimination has been a topic of much research
ever since Joan Robinson's (1933) pioneering analysis of the problem. The conventional wis-
dom has been that the welfare e®ects depend critically on the output e®ect of discrimina-
tion. It has been well known that the output e®ect, in turn, depends on the concavity of
demand and in the limiting case of linear demand, discrimination does not change aggre-
gate monopoly output. Following a series of paper (surveyed e.g., in Varian (1989)) on the
issue, Schmalensee(1981) demonstrated that in the linear demand case, price discrimination
inevitably leads to welfare loss. Subsequently, Varian (1985) generalized the result and showed
that a necessary but not su±cient condition for social welfare to rise with discrimination is a
rise in monopoly output.
The normative and positive analysis of third degree price discrimination has been extended
to the context of a spatial economy with ¯xed production location by Greenhut and Ohta
(1972), Holahan (1975) and Beckman (1976). These papers show that with linear demands,
when radius of the monopolists market area is endogenous, spatial price discrimination raises
monopoly output and, potentially, social welfare over f.o.b. mill pricing policy. However, with
a ¯xed radius, discrimination does not change output precluding the possibility of welfare
gain. When location is endogenous, Hwang and Mai (1990) show, by contrast, output and
welfare e®ect of discrimination is indeterminate and depends on the parameters of the model.
In particular, they demonstrate that welfare gain is possible even if spatial price discrimination
were to reduce output.
In a recent contribution, Layson (1998) analyzes the price, output and welfare e®ect of
third degree price discrimination when a monopolist sells in two markets with demand interde-
pendence brought about by the substitutability and complementarity of the goods. The e®ects
of price discrimination in this model are shown to depend on the degree of interdependence
as well as convexity of demands and the slope of marginal cost.
The considerable literature on third degree price discrimination has, for most part, been
1con¯ned to a deterministic world. A notable exception is the paper by Eckel and Smith
(1993). They explore the pricing decision of a multi-product monopolist facing random,
correlated demands. They assume convex cost so that expected cost can be reduced by
reducing aggregate output variance. It is then demonstrated that if the monopolist, assumed to
be risk neutral, were to maximize social welfare, the optimal prices may involve discrimination
across markets. Price discrimination, in this case, reduces aggregate demand variance by
exploiting covariance in market demands.
The paper by Eckel and Smith (1993) does not, however, address the traditional concern
surrounding the price, output and welfare e®ects of price discrimination by a private welfare
maximizing monopolist facing random demands. The purpose of the present paper is to ¯ll
this gap in the literature. We consider a model where a risk averse monopolist faces two
markets with stochastic and potentially correlated demands. The monopolist is assumed to
commit to an irreversible price in each market before the uncertainty is resolved. Third-degree
price discrimination across markets in this setting is shown to trigger several unconventional
positive as well as normative results. a) Price discrimination may occur even when price
elasticities are identical across markets. b) Direction of price discrimination may be opposite
to the conventional case. c) Discrimination may raise social welfare despite linear demands
and negative output e®ect. All of these results, as we demonstrate, are driven by risk aversion
inducing the monopolist to optimally trade return against risk, in a manner similar to portfolio
choice with risky and correlated assets.
The organization of the paper is as follows: In section 2, we develop the basic stochastic
model of third-degree price discrimination. Section 2 analyzes the price e®ects of third-degree
discrimination under uncertainty. The impact on expected output and social welfare in the
context of linear demands is developed in section 4. Section 5 presents the concluding remarks.
2 The Basic Model
Like the conventional third-degree price discrimination model, we consider a monopolist selling
a product in two divisible markets. Unlike the orthodox model, however, we assume that
2demand in both markets is subject to random, white noise, disturbances. The monopolist
is assumed to commit to prices before actual demands are revealed and then produce the
quantities necessary to clear the markets. In order to make the role of demand variance and
covariance meaningful, it is further assumed that prices, once set, will be maintained for a
signi¯cant period.1
The demand functions (labeled by subscripts 1 and 2 respectively) are assumed to be
qi = fi(pi) + ei (1)
where qi and pi are quantity demanded and the price in market i (i = 1 and 2) and f0
i < 0. We





<0: The traditional models of price discrimination assume ¾1 = ¾2 = ¾12 = 0
(i.e., demands are non-stochastic). As we will demonstrate, the volatility as well as covariance
between markets have signi¯cant positive as well as normative implication for the third-degree
price discrimination model.
For simplicity, the cost function is assumed to be linear in output,2 i.e.,
C = F + cQ (2)
where Q = q1 + q2 and F is the ¯xed cost. The pro¯t function of the ¯rm is thus given by
¦ = ¦(p1;p2;e1;e2) = (p1 ¡ c)(f1(p1) + e1) + (p2 ¡ c)(f2(p2) + e2) ¡ F: (3)
The monopolist is assumed to have a mean-variance utility function in pro¯t, which. is
given by3
U(¦) = ¦(p1;p2;e1;e2) ¡ (R=2)[¦(p1;p2;e1;e2) ¡ ¦(p1;p2;0;0)]
2; (4)
where R ¸ 0 is a risk-aversion index.
1This assumption is not uncommon in the theoretical literature in uncertainty and the behavior of the
¯rm. Clearly, the assumption makes sense in markets where frequent price adjustments are very costly due,
for example, to the cost of advertising.
2This simpli¯ed assumption rules out portfolio e®ect arising out of convex cost structure as assumed by
Eckel and Smith (1993) in their model.
3Note that for the mean-variance analysis to be valid, it must be assumed that the joint density function
is bivariate normal or the utility function is quadratic. For detail, see Huang and Litzenberger (1988).
33 Simple Monopoly vs. Price Discrimination
In this section, we begin by deriving the simple monopoly and then the price discriminating
solutions.
3.1 Simple Monopoly
If the monopolist is unable to separate markets, a common price (i.e., p1 = p2 = p) must be
set in the two markets, generating the simple monopoly solution. The expected pro¯t function
is accordingly,





2 + 2¾12] (5)











2 + 2¾12) = 0: (6)
Since f0
i < 0 and ¾2
1 + ¾2
2 + 2¾12 > 0, it is easily veri¯ed that the equilibrium price p¤ > c.
Thus, as in the standard model, the simple monopoly price must exceed marginal cost.
Let p0 be the equilibrium price under certainty, which is determined according to f0
1(p0)+
f0
2(p0)](p0 ¡ c) + f1(p0) + f2(p0) = 0. Evaluating (6) at p0 yields
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2 + 2¾12) < 0;
implying that p¤ < p0. This gives
Corollary 1: The non-discriminating price, p¤, with uncertainty is less than the corresponding
non-discriminating price in the deterministic model, p0.
This is not surprising. It is well known that a risk-averse monopolist will price closer to
marginal cost when demand is uncertain. The negative impact on utility that the fall in mean
pro¯t creates is more than o®set by the smaller variance due to the smaller markup.
43.2 Price Discrimination
In this case the ¯rm is assumed to be able to set separate prices, p1 and p2; in the two markets









The ¯rst order conditions for this maximization are given by,
@EU
@p1
= [(p1 ¡ c)f
0
1(p1) + f1(p1)] ¡ R[(p1 ¡ c)¾
2
1 + (p2 ¡ c)¾12] = 0 (8)
@EU
@p2
= [(p2 ¡ c)f
0
2(p2) + f2(p2)] ¡ R[(p2 ¡ c)¾
2
2 + (p1 ¡ c)¾12] = 0 (9)
where f0





2) be the discriminating prices under certainty, which can be obtained from (8)
and (9) by setting ¾2
1 = ¾2




















































where rho is the correlation coe±cient (i.e., ¡1 · ½ = ¾12=¾1¾2 · 1). Note that vi (i=1,2) < 0




1 < 0, @EU
@p2 jp0
1; p0
1 < 0. But if ½ 2 [¡1;max(v1;v2)], @EU
@pi jp0
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(i 6= j). Assuming that the system has a global maximum, we can therefore obtain
Corollary 2: The discriminating prices can be higher or lower under uncertainty than under
certainty, depending on the degree of market correlations. Speci¯cally,














5Clearly, when ½ (or ¾12) is positive or mildly negative, the discriminating prices with
uncertainty are lower across the board compared to the prices in the deterministic model.
But, when ½ is su±ciently negative, despite uncertainty, discriminating price in the relatively
stable market may be higher than the corresponding price without uncertainty, contrary to
the conventional wisdom. The intuition behind this price regime is that negative e®ect of
increased pro¯t volatility in the market where markup is raised is more than o®set by the
e®ect of smaller markup in the other market. The negative correlation between the markets
strengthens this e®ect.
3.3 Comparison
Here, we examine the relationship of p¤
1 and p¤
























¤ ¡ c)¾12] (11)
Rewrite (6) as @EU
@p1 jp1=p¤ + @EU
@p2 jp2=p¤ = 0. Given this, it is evident from (10) and (11) that
@EU
@p1 jp1=p¤ >
<0 if and only if @EU
@p2 jp2=p¤ <
>0. Assuming the system has a unique maximum, it
easily follows that p¤
1 > p¤ > p¤
2 or p¤
2 > p¤ > p¤
1. This con¯rms the conventional wisdom
that the price under a simple monopoly is bounded by the two discriminating prices. Two
things should be noted: (i) In the conventional model, pro¯table price discrimination requires
price elasticities of demand to di®er in the non-discriminating equilibrium. In the present
model, however, even if f1 = f2, there is still a basis for price discrimination. It is easily






<¾2; and (ii) optimal p¤
1 and p¤
2 depends not only
on the elasticities of demands, but also on relative market volatility. Thus, in the stochastic
model, the direction of price discrimination may go against the conventional grain. The elastic
market may be charged the higher and the inelastic market the lower price. Clearly, for this
unorthodox outcome to occur, the elastic market must be more risky so that the pro¯ts
sacri¯ced by the perverse price discrimination is more than made up by the smaller aggregate
pro¯t variance this brings about. To summarize then, we have
6Proposition 1 p¤
1 > p¤ > p¤
2 or p¤
2 > p¤ > p¤








Figure 1 presents a graphical description of our model. For simplicity of exposition, we
assume the following linear demand functions4 and also, without loss of generality, zero cost.
Q1 = a1 ¡ b1p1 + e1
Q2 = a2 ¡ b2p2 + e2
Lines A1B1 and A2B2 are the linear demand functions under certainty, given above. MR1
and MR2 are the corresponding marginal revenue curves (de¯ned in terms of prices). As
shown, at a common price, market 1 has the °atter (inverse) demand curve and hence, is
more elastic compared to market 2. In a non-stochastic world, with zero cost, evidently non-
discriminating price would be p0, where aggregate marginal revenue MR1(p0)+MR2(p0) = 0
(i.e., p0g1 = p0g2). If markets can be divided, discriminating prices would be at p0
1 and p0
2
respectively where marginal revenues, MR1 = MR2 = 0. Clearly, p0
1 < p0 < p0
2.
In the zero-cost stochastic model, however, the monopolist maximizes expected utility of
revenue rather than revenue itself.5 The relevant functions to look at are the marginal utility
rather than marginal revenue functions. It is easily veri¯ed from (8) and (9) that given the
assumed linear demand functions, while the marginal revenue functions are MR1 = a1¡2b1p1
and MR2 = a2 ¡ 2b2p2, marginal utility functions are u1 = (a1 ¡ p2R¾12) ¡ (2b1 + R¾2
1)p1
(which is (8)) and u2 = (a2 ¡ p1R¾12) ¡ (2b2 + R¾2
2)p2 (which is (9)). Assuming the markets
to be stochastically independent (i.e., ¾12 = 0), the marginal utility functions reduce to
u1 = a1 ¡ (2b1 + R¾2
1)p1 and u2 = a2 ¡ (2b2 + R¾2
2)p2 and are given in Figure 1 by line
4It is easily veri¯ed that these demand functions can be derived from the following concave but quasi-linear
indirect utility functions:








2 + p1e1 + p2e2 + M;
where M is the consumption of a numeraire good, produced competitively.
5Since random shocks are assumed to be additive and E(ei) = 0, line AiBi represents the expected demand
function in the stochastic model.
7u1 and u2, respectively. Clearly, these are steeper than the corresponding marginal revenue
functions. In the stochastic model, raising prices increases the variance of revenues, and
given the mean-variance utility function, monopolist's utility increases at a smaller rate than
revenues. The relative slopes of the marginal utility functions depend on the slopes of marginal
revenue functions (bi) as well as variances (¾2
i). If market 2 is su±ciently more volatile than
market 1, it is clearly possible for u2 to be steeper than u1 even though MR1 is steeper than
MR2, i.e., the market that is relatively more price elastic can become relatively less "utility
elastic." This is the case illustrated in Figure 1. The non-discriminating price is p¤ where
u1(p¤) + u2(p¤) = 0 (i.e., p¤d1 = p¤d2) and the discriminating prices are at p¤
1 and p¤
2, which
are determined by u1 = 0 and u2 = 0 respectively. Two things may be noted in the context
of this stochastic equilibrium. First, p¤, the non-discriminating price with uncertainty, is less
than the corresponding non-discriminating price in the deterministic model, p0, as claimed by
Corollary 1. Also, the discreminating prices in the stochastic model, (p¤
1;p¤
2), are lower than the
corresponding prices in the deterministic model, (p0
1;p0
2). This con¯rms Corollary 2 since the
corvariance is assumed to be zero in Figure 1. Second, since u2 is steeper than u1 while MR1 is
steeper than MR2, price is reduced (raised) in market 2 (1), which is the relatively less (more)
price-sensitive market, reversing the orthodox direction of price discrimination. Furthermore,
it is clear from ¯gure 1 that even with identical demands, a basis for utility-improving price
discrimination would arise if variances and, therefore, marginal utility functions were not
identical across markets. This con¯rms proposition 1.
4 Outputs and Social Welfare with Linear Demands
In the non-stochastic case, Schmalensee (1981) and Varian (1985) have shown that with linear
demand, aggregate output remains constant with price discrimination and Marshallian social
welfare (the sum of consumer and producer surpluses) inevitably declines. We now reexamine
this well-known conventional wisdom in the context of our stochastic model.
84.1 Aggregate Expected Output
We examines, in this subsection, the e®ect on aggregate expected output when the monopolist
practices price discrimination. For simplicity, assume that demands are linear and ¾12 = 0. It
must be noted that since output is random in our model, the appropriate basis for comparison
is expected output under discrimination and non-discrimination. From (6), (10), and (11), we
know that @EU
@p1 jp1=p¤ + @EU











¤) + ai + (R¾
2
i ¡ bi)] = 0; (12)
where qe












¤) = 0 (13)
where ¢qe
i(p¤) denotes the change in expected output delivered to market i as the ¯rm deviates











where µi = bj(2bi+R¾2
i) > 0 (i;j = 1;2; i 6= j). Evidently, under certainty (i.e., ¾1 = ¾2 = 0),
µ1 = µ2. It is clear from (14) that ¢qe
1(p¤)+¢qe
2(p¤) = 0, thus con¯rming the traditional result
that aggregate output remains constant with discrimination. Under uncertainty, the e®ect on
aggregate output under price discrimination can be either positive or negative depending on













2(p¤) < (>) 0, it requires that (µ1¡µ2) and ¢qe
2(p¤) be opposite (identical)







<0. Further, we know from our
discussion above that ¢qe
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< 0 and 2b1 + R¾2
1
<
> 2b2 + R¾2
2. Conversely, ¢qe
1(p¤) + ¢qe





< 0 and 2b1 + R¾2
1
>
< 2b2 + R¾2
2. This is summarized in
6Note that 2b1 + R¾2
1 < (>) 2b2 + R¾2
2 when u1 is °atter (steeper) than u2.
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> 2b2 + R¾2








< 2b2 + R¾2
2.
An implication of proposition 3, clearly, is that expected monopoly output must fall when-
ever the slopes of marginal revenue and marginal utility functions have opposite ranking across
markets so that price is lowered (raised) in the relatively price inelastic (elastic) market, as
shown in Figure 1.
4.2 Social Welfare
Given the quasi-linear indirect utility functions, it is well-known that the income e®ect is zero
and that expected consumer welfare can be measured by the Marshallian consumer surplus in
























1 + (p2 ¡ c)
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2
2 + 2(p1 ¡ c)(p2 ¡ c)¾12]: (16)
Denoting social welfare under discrimination and non-discrimination by WD = ECSD+EPSD
and WS = ECSS + EPSS respectively, it is easily veri¯ed that




the direction of the welfare change depending on the relative slope, size and risk characteristics
of the markets. Since no simple general criteria for welfare change seems possible, we present a
number of simulations with alternative parameter values. The results are summarized in Table
7At pi = p¤
i, q¤
i = ai ¡ bip¤
i + ei. At pi = (ai + ei)=bi, q¤










2bi : Taking the expected value of CS yields (15). Note





2bi > 0, captures the e®ect of uncertainty on aggregate expected consumer
surplus (ECS).
101. Case I represents the benchmark. In this case, markets are identically risky and market 1
has the °atter inverse demand function. Not surprisingly, the direction of price, output and
welfare change is identical to the conventional case. In case II, we make market 2 (the relatively
less price-sensitive market) signi¯cantly more risky. The positive and normative e®ects of
discrimination is dramatically reversed in this case. Price discrimination runs opposite to
the conventional case. Aggregate expected output shrinks but producer's, consumer's and
therefore social welfare rises. The intuition behind the output and price e®ects have already
been explained in Figure 1. The intuition behind the welfare paradox is straightforward.
Consider Figure 1 again. The change in consumer surplus is given, as usual, by the area
under the demand curve bounded by the prices, sikip¤
ip¤ in each market. In the zero-cost
non-stochastic model, change in producer surplus is identical to change in revenues. From the
MRi curves, it is easily seen that as price is raised (lowered) from p¤ to p¤
1 (p¤
2) in market 1
(2), social welfare decreases (increases) by s1k1j1h1 (s2k2j2h2). Clearly, s1k1j1h1 > s2k2j2h2
and social welfare declines. This is the conventional wisdom (due to Schmalensee (1981) and
Varian (1985)) that discrimination is inevitably harmful if aggregate output fails to rise.
In the stochastic model, however, the change in producer welfare is measured by the change
in expected utility rather than revenues. Thus, in market 1, expected producer utility rises
by d1p¤
1p¤ and in market 2 by p¤
2p¤d2. The expected social welfare loss (gain) in market 1 (2)
is, therefore, s1k1p¤
1d1 (s2k2d2p¤
2). As drawn, the expected social gain in market 2 outweighs
the expected loss in market 1 and expected social welfare improves despite a fall in aggregate
expected output. The reason for the reversal of orthodox intuition is easily seen. Since
pro¯t volatility is positively related to price in each market, compared to the deterministic
models, expected monopoly utility falls (rises) by the additional area h1j1p¤
1d1 (h2j2d2p¤
2) in
market 1 (2). This area, bounded by the prices and between MRi and ui curves, represents
the contribution of the change in the level of pro¯t risk to produce utility. As market 2
is signi¯cantly more unstable, the fall in price in this market reduces pro¯t volatility and
consequently raises producer's utility su±ciently to reverse the orthodox direction of welfare
change.
11Figure 2 shows the sensitivity of welfare change, in the numerical simulations, to demand
covariance. Clearly, when both markets are equally volatile (as in Case I), price discrimination
produces the same welfare e®ect as in the certainty case (i.e, higher producer welfare, but
lower consumer and social welfare), irrespective of market correlations. When market 2 is
signi¯cantly riskier (as in Case II), discrimination raises consumer, producer, and social welfare
for all feasible correlation coe±cients. When relative risk di®erential is less signi¯cant (as in
Cases III, IV), however, correlation has to be su±ciently negative for social welfare to rise. The
negative correlation in these cases serves to enhance the negative impact on overall variance
of pro¯ts when price is lowered in the more volatile market and raised in the less. To sum up,
we have
Proposition 3 : In the stochastic model, price discrimination can raise social welfare even
if both demand curves are linear and expected aggregate output falls.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have reexamined the price, output and welfare e®ects of third degree price discrimina-
tion when the discriminating monopolist faces two divisible, risky and potentially correlated
markets. We assume that the monopolist is risk averse, has a mean-variance utility function,
and commits to ¯xed prices in each market before the resolution of uncertainty. The demand
uncertainty in each market is assumed to be additive in form. In the context of such a sto-
chastic model, we demonstrate that the less price sensitive market may be charged the lower
price and, despite linear demands, aggregate expected output may fall and social welfare may
rise with price discrimination. These results, which run counter to the orthodox intuition,
are shown to be driven by the di®erence between the risk and pro¯t characteristics of the
two markets and the willingness of the monopolist to trade increased level for reduced risk of
expected pro¯ts. Although the model is based on restrictive assumptions with respect to the
nature of market uncertainty and the monopolist's utility function, like the spatial models, it
casts doubt on the presumed social undesirability of third degree price discrimination.
12Table 1: Numerical Examples
Parameter Values E®ect of Price Discrimination
Case c a1 a2 b1 b2 R ¾2
1 ¾2
2 ¢W ¢ECS ¢EPS Qpd ¡ Qs p1 ¡ ps p2 ¡ ps
I 1 10 10 2 1 1 1 1 - - + + - +
II 1 10 10 2 1 1 1 4 + + + - + -
III 1 10 5 2 1 1 1 2 +/- - + - + -
IV 1 10 10 1 1 1 1 2 +/- - + - + -
Note: The sign pattern holds for all ¡¾1¾2 · ¾12 · ¾1¾2. The detail of the simulation is
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